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“pproved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-00780R00 Chief, Information Systems Analysis Staff 2E 42 Has OGC has the action responsibility, but the DD/M~S would appreciate it if you would keep us posted on developments, particularly if the position is taken that the Agency should release the quarterly reports: Att: DD/MES 74-2407 Executive officer to the DD FMS T 7D 26 Hqs 1 Jul 74 T EO-DD/M$S:Okmg (1 Jul 74) Distribution: File Orig RS Adse w/0 of Att - DD/M&S Subject w/cy of Att 1 - DD/M&S Chrono DD/M&S 74-2407: Ltr dtd 24 Jun 74 to DCI fr Edmund S. Muskie re workings of EO 11652 and the security classification system Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-0078OR006100110020-3 Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-0078fRnna1 nnh 10 SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET ACTION I i DIRECT REPLY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP DATE TIALS ~/ 7 CONCURRENCE INFORMATION I SIGNATURE APPROVAL I I DISPATCH 0~-' ~ml ~~ FORM NO. 23 / Use previous editions 1-67 J FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE R00 6 OO2 EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT Routing Slip Executive Secretary pproLed For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-00780R006100110020-3 ACTION INFO DATE INITIAL 1 DCI 2 DDCI 3 S/MC 4 DDS&T 5 DDI 6 DDM&S y-: 7 DDO 8 D/DCI/IC 9 D/DCI/NIO 10 OGC 11 OLC 12 IG 13 Compt 14 D/Pers 15 D/S 16 DTR 17 Asst/ DCI 18 AO/DCI 19 20 21 22 177;"&S 7'/- 2;i :, ,{~ [ SAM J. ERVIN. Appr.owedAFor Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-0078OR00610011 QU04J ' , E LL A K L N. AR . CHARLES H. PERCY, ILL. 10- aa:._ Hc`.!~V^! ',. JACKSON. WASH. JACO3 K. JAVITS, N.Y. LIDMJND S. MUSKIE, M.\INE EDWARD J. GURNEY, F' A. AURA-'AM RI3ICCFF, CONN. WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR.. DEL. LEE M-TCALF, MONT. BILL BROCK, TENN. JAMES 9. ALLEN, ALA. LA'.VTO `, CHILES, FLA. SAM Y.UNN, GA. WALT ER D. HJODLESTON. KY. SAM J. ERVIN, JR., N.C. EDWARD J. GURNEY, FLA. LEE METCALF. MONT. WILLIAM V. ROTH. JR., 0',L_ JOHN L. MCCLELLAN. ARK. BILL BROCK. TENN. LAWTON CHILES. FLA. ROBERT BLAND SMITH. JR. CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (PURSUANT TO SEC. 5, S. RES. 241, 11D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION) WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510 June 24, 1974 Honorable William E. Colby Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505 Dear Mr. Colby: ALVIN FROM. STAFF DIRECTOR 357 R'JSSELL BUILDING (202) 225-0773 The Subcommittee on intergovernmental Relations has completed its first set of oversight hearings on the workings of Executive Order 11652 and the security classi- fication system. I want to take this occasion to express my appreciation to you and the Central Intelligence Agency for the full cooperation the subcommittee received in con- ducting its inquiry from General Counsel John Warner and his staff. His testimony of May 29 reflected the attention given to classification problems throughout the Agency and the amount of hard work going into the effort to reform ingrained attitudes toward security and public information. It is my intention to continue and extend these oversight hearings this year and next, and I would like very much to solicit your further assistance in the study. Specifically, I would appreciate it if the Agency could forward to the subcommittee on a regular basis the four quarterly reports on authorized classifiers, classifica- tion abuses, unauthorized disclosures, and mandatory review requests and the quarterly siLmmary report it transmits to the Interagency Classification Review Committee. Please feel free to delete from those reports any classified -- material or any identification of specific individuals you feel would be inappropriate for the public record. In general, I hope the subcommittee staff will enjoy in-the future the same kind of cooperation in this Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-0078OR006100110020-3 Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-0078OR006100110020-3 William E. Colby June 2k, 1974 Page Two area it has so far received from the Agency. And, of course, I look forward to further evidence of progress in the Agency in implementing the programs and outlook on classification which Mr. Warner so well described. help. Thank you very much for your past and future Edmund S. MIuskie Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-0078OR006100110020-3”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp84-00780r006100110020-3: NOTES TO CHIEF, INFORMATION SYSTEMS ANALYSIS STAFF FROM LJD
Synopsis
“Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200106b0 SECURITY INFOR INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM SOCIALIZATION OF CHINESE AGRICULTURE/ CIA/RR IM-370 24 November 1952 WARNING THIS MAITERIAL CONTAINS 'ORMA.TIOTNN AFFECTING WIT1nN NG THE THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAW, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 791+, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Research and Reports Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 CIA/RR IM-370 SECURITY I SOCIALIZATION OF CHINESE AGRICULTURE Sm maxy The land reform program initiated in Communist China in 1947 aims at the complete socialization of Chinese agriculture. In its initial stages, land reform in Communist China has followed, with some mod- ifications, the pattern established by the USSR, in particular as it has been applied in the European Satellites. First, the great land- lords and even the more well-to-do peasants are dispossessed, and their holdings are distributed among the landless and land-poor peasants. Then follows the fostering of various types of cooperatives, all within the aura of intensive propaganda aimed toward the complete socialization of agriculture. The process is proceeding in Communist China more rapidly than was anticipated. By the spring of 1952, land had been redistributed to about 300 million peasants (including mem- bers of their households). So far, it appears that agricultural production in Communist China has not been measurably affected as a result of the land distribution, although it is still too early to evaluate with any degree of certainty the effects on agricultural production. 1. Redistribution of Land. The Chinese Communist program of land reform was initiated under the Agrarian Law of September 1947.,1/* This law abolished owner- ship rights in land and provided for the confiscation of land and means of production belonging to "landlords and kulaks" and the trans- fer of this property to landless and land-poor peasants as private property. Land confiscation followed the "liberation" of new ter- ritories by the Chinese Communist armies, generally in a geographic pattern beginning in the Northeast (Manchuria) and North China -- so-called old liberated areas -- through the East, Central-South, and Southwest regions of China. * Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in the Appendix. Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 During the period between "liberation" and land redistribution a rent reduction program. was carried out. Instructions were given to create within 1 to 2 years the necessary conditions for land. reform; that is, a stabilized situation including the evacuation of all Nationalist troops, a demand from the majority of peasants for con- fiscation and redistribution, and enough agrarian reform workers guiding the movement to assure success. At the same time, steps were to be taken to prevent a falling off in agricultural production. Thus the actual work of land distribution was usually carried out after the fall harvests and relaxed at spring planting time. According to the official plan, land was to be distributed progres- sively over a series of years, so that by the spring of 1952 the first stages of land reform would have been completed and specified numbers of the rural population would have been benefited, on the following schedule _!? by the spring of 1949, 100 million people; by the spring of 1950, 157 million; by the spring of 1951, 285 million; and by the spring of 1952, 385 million. Certain districts have been excluded from this schedule: Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, the Northwest, and Tibet. Because of the indigenous customs pertaining to land tenure among the minority ethnic groups living in these districts, a different technique to be described later is being applied. Members of peasant households in Honan received from 2 to 3 mou (0.13 to 0.2 hectare) of land per capita, and in Hunan and Hupeh the allotments of land ranged from 1 to 2.5 mou (0.06 to 0.17 hectare). ! By the spring of 1952, about 300 million peasants, including mem- bers of their households, had received land benefits, and it is the expectation that land distribution will have been completed by the end of 1952. J As a rule, certificates of proprietorship have been issued to peasants receiving land. 5/ As a means of checking the progress of their program, the Communist hierarchy sent out inspection teams in the early part of 1952 to deter- mine irregularities and report cases in which the land reform had not been successful. Persons accused of being deviationists were very often subjected to violence. It is, in fact, estimated that at least 1.5 million people have been executed and that perhaps 35 million to 45 million have been stigmatized as "exploiters" and have been. pauperized and maltreated in varying degrees. 61 It is possible that this pro- cedure has been used as a tool to create a "labor force" for use on government projects such as the Huai Ho water conservancy project. Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/21.: CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 S-E-C-R-E-T 2. Role of the Comunist Party in the Redistribution of Land. Con:i.st Party has rigidly controlled the redistribution of land inChina through directives to Party cadres, who are trained and then sent to the villages to organize work teams to effect the con- fiscation of land, to classify the inhabitants (that is, as landloi&s, middle peasants, and poor peasants), and actually to distribute the land. Furthermore, following the distribution of the land, the cadres engage in completely reorganizing rural life. By indoctrination and training they are attempting to gain control of the people at the grass-roots level, especially in old "liberated" areas like North China and the Northeast. 3. Further Steps in Chinese Communist Agrarian Policy. The Chinese Communists do not intend that the land redistribution is to be an end in itself. It is only-the first stage in their agrar- ian policy. Land redistribution was almost immediately followed by a second stage inaugurated by the organization of so-called Mutual Aid Teams. The programs set up for these Mutual Aid Teams have been of four general types: (a) The first type is the interchange of labor at seeding time in spring. (b) The second type is the interchange of labor during each of the three busy seasons of planting, cultivating, and harvesting. In this program, the winter season, when supplemental income is earned, is not included. (c) The third type is the estab- lishment of a year-round labor pool in which implements and animals sometimes are awned Jointly, and sometimes working capital is also pooled. (d) The fourth type is the cooperative farming of the land, with all operations of`planting, cultivating, and harvesting performed on. a partnership basis, production being divided according to inputs. This fourth type still excludes the winter supplemental work. 7 It has been officially announced that 80 percent of farm households in Manchuria and 55 percent in North China have been organized into Mutual Aid Teams of one or another of these four general types, Statistics are incomplete for the rest of China, but percentages of organization are undoubtedly lower than in the North and Northeast, where Communist control is not so firm. The 19-52 plan for North. China is to organize 70 to 80 percent of all peasants into cooperatives and other types of Mutual Aid Teams. The next stage of the agrarian reform is the organization of the Agricultural Producer Cooperative, in which all boundaries of house- .hold lands are eradicated and in which there is a complete division of activities among labor groups. The government encourages the S -E -C -R -E -T Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 S-E-C-R-E-T evolution of the four types of Mutual Aid Teams into the Agricultural Producer Cooperative type. The shares of each member in the profits are governed by the individual's inputs of land, labor, and capital. In an April speech, Kao Kang, chairman of the Northeast China People's Government, stated that there are now more than 1,200 Agricultural Producer Cooperatives in the Northeast.* At the same time that Agricultural Producer Cooperatives are being encouraged by the government, state farms are being organized in increasing numbers. There are 52 relatively large state farms in various localities, 10 including 20 large mechanized farms in Man- churia. 11 The latter have been in existence since the Japanese occupation and were taken over by the Communist government'in 1948. The purpose of the large farms in Manchuria is to train cadres of young Communists. in modern mechanized farming methods and at the same time to indoctrinate them with the "political ideology" which is thought to be correlated with the idea of collective farming. Wheat and soy- beans are mostly grown on these farms. The goal is to establish a state farm at regional, provincial, county, and subcounty levels, to serve as a model for Mutual Aid Teams and Agricultural Producer Cooperatives. Nationalization of the land has not entered into the Chinese pic- ture as yet. The Chinese Communists are convinced, however, that agriculture must be collectivized if China is to acquire the capital and labor it needs for industrialization. 4. Evaluation of Chinese Communist Agrarian Policy. There are many indications that the Chinese Communists are in a general way following in the path of Communists in the USSR and the European Satellites, benefiting perhaps in some instances by their experiences and mistakes. As in the USSR, the first principle of action has been the abolition of private ownership of land "in order to free the rural productive forces, develop agricultural production, and thus pave the way for New China's industrialization." 12/ By this means the regime will gain control of agricultural production. Like the USSR, China needs agricultural commodities to barter for industrial goods. * Kao Kang further stated that the Northeast would be fully mechanized within 5 or 6 years. 9/ Before the Japanese war, 80 percent of the total value of China's exports cam from agricultural commodities. - 4 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 S E-C-R-E-T The genuine grievances of the Chinese peasants have been skillfully utilized by the Chinese Communists in their struggle for political power, agrarian reform being made an effective political instrument. Consequently, one characteristic of the land policy of the Chinese Communists is its synchronization with political expediency. Certainly it can be expected that the regime became popular to a degree, having given the "land to the tillers," 12 which was the promise of Sun Yat Sen. What has actually followed as an immediate after-effect is a matter of conjecture. There have been reports 13 that the taxes exacted by the Communists are higher than total taxes under the old government -- the announced rate is no higher than 37 percent of all crops produced -- but some reports indicate that it is often as high as 50 to 70 percent. When the 1952 wheat harvest turned out to be better than average, the government immediately announced a higher collection rate. In addition to taxes, farmers are induced to make "voluntary" contributions to "victory bonds" and to "arms for Korea." Since dune 1950, Chinese Communist tactics have been to encourage a "rich" peasant economy. By efforts to induce peasants to work with- out fear that their produce would be requisitioned, the government hopes to stimulate production. "Rich" peasants are encouraged because their land and means of production are generally superior and because their productivity is therefore higher than the average. At the same time, the government has taken steps to minimize resistance to its policies. As in all primitive countries, Chinese peasant farmers are wedded to the principle of private property and do not understand the "advantage" to be gained from nationalization. Another aspect of the Chinese Communist agricultural policy is that great stress has been placed on endouraging the peasants to organize voluntarily, a process which may permit China to avoid the disruption that followed the forced collectivization of land in the USSR in the early 19301s. According to one report, 25X1 X7 Kao Kang said 15/: "Cooperatives in such manner that is, forcibly organize d3 will produce very poor results and will leave a bad impression upon the people, adding dif- ficulties to the future development of Agricultural Producer Cooperatives." - 5 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 S-E-C-R-E-T Propaganda, political pressure, and economic inducements are combined to convince peasants of the "advantages" of Mutual Aid Teams and Agri- cultural Producer Cooperatives. For instance, farm equipment supply stations, fertilizer cooperatives, and so on, give priority of supply to Mutual Aid Teams and Agricultural Producer Cooperatives. In the Northwest and some other areas where there are ethnic minor- ities, the implementation of the land reform differs from that carried out in areas populated by Chinese. Chinese Communist officials have even stated 161: "Before land reform can be carried out well, it must be demanded by the local minority nationality masses, concurred in by the leading personages, directed by localities, and its method of implementation planned in complete conformity with local conditions. "There will be no expropriation of land owned by Mohammedan mosques and Tibetan monasteries for distribu- tion. These lands are closely related to the religious faith of the masses and they must be differentiated from the land of the landlords." In China proper the graves which, it is said, occupy 2 percent of the arable land, have so far been left intact, although many churches have been confiscated and are used for grain storage. It is perhaps too early to judge the results of the agrarian pol- icies, but it appears that agricultural production has not been meas- urably affected as a result of the land distribution. It is reported that some peasants have already become disenchanted with the regime -- with its interference in their private lives, and constant drives for donations added to the high taxes -- and have resisted through the weapon of lowered production. This result is difficult to ascertain, however, from production statistics, because of the long period of war with Japan, then civil war and disruption, and a serious drought in 1949. Among the problems which will confront the Chinese Communist govern- ment are a further subdivision of the tillable land and the practical application of mechanization. The latter cannot be accomplished with- out the consolidation of small holdings into units large enough for the economic use of modern farm machinery which is one of the reasons for the government stressing the Agricultural Producer Cooperative. - 6 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 S-E-C-R-E-T For the Communists, the mechanization of agriculture is pre- requisite to industrialization, and in China it seems a particularly formidable problem. Agricultural implements cannot be manufactured domestically in sufficient amounts, and the more urgent need of other items precludes the importation of agricultural implements. There is no evidence of the importation of agricultural machinery in signif- icant quantities either from the USSR or from other sources. On the other hand, the estimated industrial labor force of China and Man- churia today is about 2 million as contrasted with an agricultural labor force of 200 million to 240 million. Chinese industry is unable to absorb the present surplus agricultural labor, and there would have to be a tremendous expansion in industry before the additional labor supply released by the mechanization of agriculture could possibly be absorbed. It is believed that mechanization of agriculture in China will follow the same general pattern as was followed in the USSR, and as is being followed in the European Satellites today. This pattern is to propagandize mechanization, but to defer its being put into effect until such time as industry has developed to a point where it can pro- vide the necessary farm machinery and also absorb additional manpower. In all the present Communist countries, at the time that the Communist regimes came into power, there existed a situation similar to that now obtaining in China -- a general inadequacy of industry and a large agricultural population, generally under employed. In the USSR, mechanization of agriculture was not attempted until 10 or 15 years after the Russian Revolution of 1919. The European Satellite govern- ments are only now beginning to make serious attempts to mechanize agriculture, 7 or 8 years after gaining power. How long the mechaniza- tion of agriculture will require in Communist China is difficult to foretell, but it is believed to be several years in the future. -7- S E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 S-E-C-R-E-T APPENDIX SOURCES Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated "Eval.," have the following significance: A - Completely reliable B - Uusually reliable C - Fairly reliable D - Not usually reliable E - Not reliable F - Cannot be judged 1 - Confirmed by other sources 2 - Probably true 3 - Possibly true 4 - Doubtful 5 - Probably false 6 - Cannot be judged Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author does not disagree with the evaluation on the cited document. 1. People's China, Supplement to No. 2, Vol. II, 16 Jul 1950. U. Eval. RR A-1. 2. OIR Report No. 5713, 8 Nov 1951. R. Eval. RR B-3. 3. Chao Kuo-chun, "Current Agrarian Reform Policies in Communist China," reprinted from The Annals of the American Academy of Politic-1 and Social Science, Sep 1951. U. Eval. RR 1. 4+. Department of State Despatch No. 1126, Hong Kong, 5 Dec 1951. U. Eval. RR 3. The figure given in this source is 310 million. Later data, 25X1 A2g however, indicate that "areas with t-t-.1 rural population of 300 million have fulfilled land reform." FBIS, 1 Oct 1952, p. AAA 26. R. Eval. RR C-3. 25X1X7 6. OIR Report No. 5713, 8 Nov 1951, P. 5. R. Eval. RR B-1. 7. 8. OIR Report No. 5650.8, 15 Mar 1952. S. Eval. RR B-i. 9. FBIS, 21 Apr 1952. R. Eval. RR 2. -8- S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/21 CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 .Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 S-E-C-R-E-T 25X1 A2gDP79 001-4 2 1X Eval. F-2. l3. These reports include: IR-52-52, CIA 727878, 26 10. People's China, No. 19, 1 Oct 1952, p. 17. U. Eval. RR 2. 11. Interrogation of August Schill, 7 Mar 1952. S. Eval. RR F-3. 12. People's China, Supplement to No. 2, Vol. II, A2ticle 1. U. Eval _. P%.R A-i. 25X1X7A 15. FBIS, 21 Apr 1952, AAA 23. R. Eval. S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp79t00935a000200170001-4: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM SOCIALIZATION OF CHINESE AGRICULTURE
Synopsis
“Approved For Release 2001/11/21 : CIA-RDP80-0081 OA001100750002-5 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT This Document contains information affecting the Na- tional Defense of the United ^tatu, within the mean. ini of Title 18, Sections 70.7 and 704, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its trans lesion or revelation of its oontenps to or receipt by an unauthorised person is prohibited by law, The reproduction of this fopm is prohibited. SWIM IICUrnTY INFORMATION COUNTRY Czechoslovakia, SUBJECT Governmental Reorganization SATE OF INFO, 25X1 C PLACE ACQUIRED REPORT NO. DATE DISTR. NO. OF PAGES REQUIREMENT NO. REFERENCES 25X1A 6 August 1953 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 3. ThS I ieter "of Food 'I`ndustrryy in the spring of 1952 was tudmil.a JANl OVCOVA, former Social Democrat. The Minister of Agrioultural"Supplies.at that time was Josef-!R MAR, a Communist. ,cMinisteretvo Prtiunyelu), the Ministry of '?06d Industry (Minieteretvo Vzivy), Pd the Ministry of Agriculture tMinieterotvo Zemedeletyi). In the middle of the year, a reshuffling of the m,nietry responsibilities occurred, resulting in the liquidation of ~,~,a Miniitrr..,. of Food l'ndustry. This ministry had been located at Prague, II, Lrakoveka uliose Twolnewministries were established to take its place, viz., the Ministry of Food T iduetry (IIIinisteretvo Potravinarskiho 'Prumyslu) located at Cukerni Palec, V1avl1.ckovo Na!Seetj , and the Ministry of Agrioultur$l. Supplies (Ministerstvo 9kuplz) located at aclaveke Nameeti, No. $3. there were only three economically important ministries in c s ova at the beginning of .Q'7 Th s ese e th 25X1X Approved For Release 2001/11/21 : CIA-RDP80-00810A001100750002-5 SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION The Ministry of Agriculture remained-the sane, except for the; lose of its food procurement responsibility which was transformed into the new Ministry of 4g.%' .e air: r al ,~. law Julius DHRIS was` Minister of Agriculture until early 1952 when he became Commissar (Pawerenik) for Agriculture in Slovakia. he Commissar for Agriculture In Slovakia is the chief administrative officer for agricultural,,. affairs, in Slovakia and is responsible only to the Prime Minister of.Czecbes levakia,, not to the Minister of Agriculture The Slovak Commissar for Agriculture thus has extraordinary power. Other Commissars in. Slovakia are responsible to their respective ministers in Prague. These Commissars are essentially vice-ministers, and carry out the wishes of the ministers The Minister of Agriculture in May 1952 vas J 3*f NEPOMUCKY, a Comunist, who, from 19:46 to 1952, had been. chaiac an of the Agricultural Council in Moravia. During the same period (middle of 1951), the Ministry of Industry underwent a reorganization which caused it to be split into three ministries, viz., the Ministry of Light Industry, the Ministry of Heavy Industry? and the Ministry of Mines and Foundries. The Ministry of Light industry (Ministerstvo Lehkeho Prumyslu) had offices in Prague II, N a Poriei. 5X1A The building was located between the Masaryk Station and the Denis Station, and across the street from a firm known as Hila Labut (White Swan). The Ministry administered industrial organizations which produced goods from leather, glass, textiles, rubber, ceramics, and synthetics. The Ministry of Heavy industry (Ministerstvo Tezkeho Prumysl retained as its own the offices of the former Ministry of Indastr7 at Prague II, Na Frantisku 2. The Ministry administered plants engaged in the production ' of machinry, which was classified as lights;. medium,, and heavy. Light machinery included compressors, small electric motors and turbines, fans, and ventilators. Medium machinery; included -conveying machines, elevators, electro -technical apparatus, lathes, and other machine tools. Heavy machinery included chemical production equipment, steam turbines, diesel motors, steam boilers and other steam machinery, heavy electric equipment, such as dynamos, electric wiring, cables and conductors? and mining machinery. 9. The Ministry of Mines and Foundries (Mimisteretvo Dolu a Hutnibo 1A Pr y slu had offices at Prague XII, Slezeka ulice. n The building was between Koruni trida and a n va- r? . a. n V 5 1 wines, and the production of metals from ores. 10. The Minister of Industry in 1950 was Gustav KLIMENT, who became. Minister of Heavy Industry at the time of the reshuffling. May or dune 1952, KLIMENT was made Chairman of the Central Trade Union Council (IIstredni RAda Odboru -- URO), which held its meetings at Prague I, NaPerstine 8. KLIMENT'a successor as Minister of Heavy Industry was JiCi'Ima MAURER, a Communist, who had no technical qualifications. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/11/21 : CIA-RDP80-00810A001100750002-5”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp80-00810a001100750002-5: GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION
Synopsis
“Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/08: CIA-RDP57-00011A001000170110-6 uorry'j or 29 dune, 1.9% r.L -.r:TD T; ~i~a Finance Division , Accounts Branch Richard 4. ii3sei1, Jr. 12-15 Feeb - I .56 L It is requested that subject - WI 144.1 accountb be credited in the mount of The difference between this clam-I a-u3 the related advance of OO.O0 dr n n on 13 Febmarr 14?56 has bec!n liquidated .~ by a refund of ~.. , (See Receipt P o, dated - - ---- PS Jtwro_ 1T5!_ __ -o M..r..._... 2. For your protection in taking this action, I certify that there is in the custody of the i'roject Comptroller a sufficient voucher which is con- sistent with Agency regulations, approved by an appropriate approri. authority and certified by an authorized certifying officer in the mount of ? 3 This expense is properly chargeable as follows: OBLIGATIO I OBJ LCT T`rAV_L O1Di-2 110. ALLOTT' T' SYTYBOL RE W. NO. CLASS /0C11FrO3...i'.56.. 6.2004-404 a $751 0201 A;?OUNT 3. The Security Office has requested that this voucher not be released through normal administrative channels, Distribution: OFil - Addressee 3 - Voucher file it - Prof. Pers. file - Chrono Authorized CertiWng Officer Project Comptroller Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/08: CIA-RDP57-00011AO01000170110-6”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp57-00011a001000170110-6: RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR. - TRAVEL CLAIM FOR PERIOD 12-15 FEBRUARY 1956
Synopsis
“CEC 2 7 1962 5EAYrLP ~~II AA h33h~ POST_IN'1E'LAOi I For Release 2000/06/13: CIR-00MA-00001 A Hearst Newspaper Member of The Aasoctated Press CHARLES B. LINDEMAN, PUBLISHER EDWARD T. STONE, EDITOR TRUTH-JUSTICE PUBLIC SERVICE 14 Seattle, Thursday, December 27, 1962 S The writ fn rmriccsoge is the one th st LIVES uban Prisoners A rele se"of 1,113 Cubans captured in the de- -Bay of P *s invasion becomes one hind t.hr ~:ceneS:, n training the rele e attth ? t played an important, and perhaps decisive, I uw nh ed that the United States govt f illl t worth of ~hbdicines, dt'ugs and baby foods. should have been actively oncerned. It has had a had conscience in this affair. The Cuban patriot. mini trati`" on Ind th~CIA. Then, by an incredible tortarttly air cover, that was essential if the effort nedy, who aec,ted persons responsihilit for the were involved ii;; ie~W orftnother in the long and seemingleless go1,iations to bring about the Of J in n 13.20 van, N w WYork lawyer, to serve dune lvlr..uonovan nas teen serving>vitlout pay, and it is his pa,_.tience. skill and persistence that brought T jv, s `a a?omple,operation in humanity and a,s an c yan newspaper, we feel better now that; It has ,eeei ed. We dn'"nnt believe as some a ear , pp CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2000/06/13 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100380068-2”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp75-00001r000100380068-2: CUBAN PRISONERS
Synopsis
“Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80-0081OA004100300006-7 CLASSIFICATIC NSECR' T _ , asst G rranv __ TQF'IC~E_Militarv Z9oxzt3_on i'tziu Thas9:r?n aie!'?fife _-.-PLACE OBTAINED,- DATE OF CONTENT _- U'-. N c-bb- 54 _....-- - 25X1 DATE OBTAINED- 25X1 _m _ Ai F. PREPARED-___ REFERENCES PAGES.. _ .a . I ?-ENCLOSURES (N-J. & TYPE)_____ 25X1 25X1 1,, In the morning on 11 March 1954.p the Perez-Liobaro3e r cad .: blo r. a L ;t south of Lieberose, between kilometerx ks 25.5 award 29.9 o : has,:: d from 25X1 the troop training grounds. Fourteen rockwt s re r a: c. up about 500 "U-0 ' 70U s east of the road at intervals of :out 40 ;i,~t5 w ? 2'x.;5 25X1 re seen in the tra.ninw ?. On 11 March little construction work wan done in the 1wt>:. t?.c? c.; k ;W;r34~ 25X1 hausexa., because of insufficient supply with nia.te. ia:? ? The sc ~c d tochA i.cal section of the installation was bor.-:r ng surrounded by a --pecia1 f'ouco 25X1 the tank sheds were occupied to capacity/2 25X1 4}~ 25X1 Refit of the Fourth Us Mach Army hold fi ing practice at :L-F 3bero io,;; 25X1 LgSKAr,e at0 The installation is ca,.rz i. wd oco ap .ad Sze pr e moue;. l : by the Roth Gd;.? Rv Tank SP Refit of the 9th Mach Dune ; SI JC TIC,,; S 0RE olori.ante of t :.e 312th Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP80-00810A004100300006-7”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp80-00810a004100300006-7: MILITARY INFORMATION FROM THE LIEBEROSE TROOP TRAINING GROUNDS
Synopsis
“fllz 2 /`~- r Approved For Release 200 - "Oft2OO2OOO33-1 (,,Em RAT: 1 3 LICENCE AGM Y Geogc?a. r' Division, ORR roject Initiation Neinorandua a Chief, Geographic Research Y-, m. Act Chief, Geography Div.1sion Project Was, See below Dates 1 July 1958 =; uby ct a at No o P NIS Chapters 1K -- Sala aduie for F'! 1960 MIS. NoD and Area Contributions due D1QG Charier to OBI . t e r ~:io 1 683 30M Iraq .*. N-arch 1959 Au, ;ist 1959 . . 0:2 16 13AN Fast Germany April. 199 October 1959 ;v,i685 76 Costa Rica May 1959 No tuber 1959 25X1X7 61?1686 June 1959 Ja;riar, y 1960 6Q0.687 5W Frerh West . frica. August 1959 Fe :.?uary 1960 o ,1688 September 1959 March 1960 w-~o"1b89 25X6A October 1959 Ap :L1 1960 E .o 1.690 50B Nigeria & November 1959 Ju.w 9 :L960 "note: Proje 6O 1,571 has been re -v,sfgrned to NIS No., 25B, Malta, inasm'u h as change in the l6 199 schedule wa.~7 made by the NIS Chapter IX Subcommitteeo Therefore,, NIS 3a` , Iraq, is due one month later than formerly scheduled tnd is given a new project nt!mber in the Schkadule for F! 1960, The schedule or NIS 25C, MaB;a, Is: Contribution due 0G/C November 1958;; Chapter due Ohl, dune 1959. Geographic Research r i Chief, Geograp 1: r t-siou $ JUL 1958 JUL 1958 Approved For Release 2000/06/30 CIA-RDP61-00391R000200200033-1”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp61-00391r000200200033-1: NIS CHAPTERS IX--SCHEDULE FOR FY 1960
Synopsis
“Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP62-00647A000200030042-2 CONFIDENTIAL 27th Jatruary, 1960 0000M Document No. 3859 COORDINATING COMMITTEE RECORD OF STATEMENT BY THE GEMAN DELEGATE ON A UNITED KINGDOM REFUSAL TO EXPORT A VIERRTOR TO POLM 25th January. 1960 Present: Belgium (Luxembourg), Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. References: COCOM Documents Nos. 3815 and 3845. The German Delegate referred to the statement made by the United Kingdom Delegate (COCOM 3815) concerning the refusal of the United Kingdom authorities to grant a licence for the export of an electro-magnetic moving coil vibrator to Poland. The German authorities entirely shared the views of the United Kingdom authorities and would themselves refuse a licence for this equipment. C O N F I D E N T I A L C O N F I D E N T I A L 27 ienvier 1960 Doct. COCOM 3859 B COMITE DE COORDINATION COMPTE RENDU DUNE DECLATUMON DU DELEGUE DE L'ALLEMAGNE RELATIVE A UN REFUS BRITANNIQUE D'EXPORTER UN VIBRATEUR VERS LA POLOGNE Le 25 janvier 1960 Presents : Allemagne, Belgique (Luxembourg), Canada, Etats-Unis, France, Italie, Japon, Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni, Turquie. References : Docts. C0COM 3815, 3845? Le ddldgue de 1'Allemagne se rdfere a une declaration du deldgue bri- tannique (Doct. COCOM 3815) relative au refus de la part du gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de delivrer une licence pour 1'exportation vers la Pologne d'un vibrateur electromagnetique a bobine mobile. Le delegue declare que les auto-- rites allemandes partagent entierement les vues du gouvernement britannique et refuseraient egalement de delivrer une licence pour l'exportation de ce materiel. C0NFIDENTIEL Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP62-00647A000200030042-2”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp62-00647a000200030042-2: COORDINATING COMMITTEE RECORD OF STATEMENT BY THE GERMAN DELEGATE ON A UNITED KINGDOM REFUSAL TO EXPORT A VIBRATOR TO POLAND 25TH JANUARY, 1960
Synopsis
“Approved =Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80R01g1R002000060130-4 27 December 1972 Mr. Riordan Roett Acting Director Vanderbilt University Nashville, Tennessee 37203 Many thanks for your letter of 29 November and my apologies for not having answered it before. As far as I know the translation of Marshal Mascaren:(1as de Morais' book was done as a special project by the U. S. Army and I do not know of any similar cases. However, I will check up on this and let you know. I believe some of General Lyra Tavares (former War Minister and now Ambassador to Paris) works may have been translated into English and I may have some of them. If so, I will send them on to you. I am sending you separately another copy of Marshal Mascarenhas de-Morais' book for the Vanderbilt library. With every good wish for 1973. Faithfully, Vernon A. Walters Lieutenant General, USA Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R002000060130-4”
Carta ao Sr. Riordan Roett de Vernon A. Walters
Synopsis
“Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000400080006-1 91sT CONGRESS 2D SESSION I-I . R. 15628 IN TIIE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES MAY 11, 1970 Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed AMENDMENT Intended to be proposed by Mr. MUSKIE (for himself, Mr. AN- DERSON, Mr. CANNON, Mr. GRAVEL, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. PACKWOOD, Mr. PEARSON, Mr. PERCY, Mr. SCOTT, and Mr. 'WILLIAMS of New Jersey) to I1.II. 15628, an Act to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act, viz : On page 4, after line 17, add the following new section : 1 SEC. 7. (a) The success of a land reform program in 2 Vietnam is a material factor in the future political and eco- 3 nomic stability of that nation, and the speed with which such 4 a program is given effect may have consequences with re- 5 Bard to the termination of hostilities there. 6 (b) The President is authorized to use funds appro- Amdt. No. 621 Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000400080006-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000400080006-1 2 iriaated pursuant to this section to encourage and support, the rapid itnpletttentaation of the national land reform program onateted in la.relt 1970 by the Government of South Viet- tarn. The use of stivii funds for land reform in Vietnam shall .te contingent upon the atttatiiniwnt of mutually agreed goals of accomplishment stressing econonir, efficiency, and ad- vanced implemefflattion of the program by July 1, 1972. Trarlehc s for land reform aassist~anee to the Government of Vietnam shall be made at quarterly intervals based upon satisfactory achievement toward the 1972 target goal. (c) (Grants nt:tt? also be ]mice. out of Rinds appropriated Imrsctaitt. to this section, for the 1)11 re( arse amid sltil-utcttt to V'ietnattu of goods and commodities. matnufatct.tired or pro- duced in the United States, which, by their introduction into the Vietnamese economy, will contribute to sound economic development in Vietnam. Such goods and commodities (1) shall be of a type approved by the President for such pro- grams; (2) shall include goods suitable for agricultural sttp- plies, business inventories in nonluxttry interprises, and c:atPi- tal goods for cToctonlie development; and (3) may be exchanged for boards issued by the Government of Vietnam to compensate landowners chose lands are transferred to other persons tinder such programs, or used in such other 21 wat,v is the Government of Vietnam may determine, consist- ent With the purposes of this section, Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000400080006-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000400080006-1 1 (d) In order to carry out the provisions of this section, 2 there are authorized to be appropriated $200,000,000 in 3 fiscal year 1971. Funds appropriated under this section are 4 authorized to remain available until expended. Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000400080006-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000400080006-1 Amdt. No. 621 91~Q H. R. 1 628 Szomm Intended to be proposed by Mr. Mvsgne (for himself, Mr. A.'4 zPso'.-T, Mr. CANNON, Mr. GRAM,, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. M&o msoN, Mr. PAcKwoon, Mr. PEASaoN, If r. PrBcT, Mr. Scorr, and Mr. WxY u-vm of New Jersey) to H.R.15628, an Act to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act. MAY 11,1970 Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000400080006-1 AMENDMENT”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp72-00337r000400080006-1: H.R. 15628
Synopsis
“'PYRGHT . Q Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP75-000 Frurct /~ aJ Othor Pe ca (laps Pags .SYRACUSE, N.Y. HERALD-JOUR;:AL E-132,647 HERALD-A'~ERICAN ExCA agent 0 I'to no LIS I CPYRGHT By PETER BERNSTEIN Of Our Washington Bureau Johnson's-hot commission Fri- day selected a former officer of the Central Intelligence Agency .to find out'whether recent city riots were planned. He is ~14ilanCarl _Misk ky, now a Treasury Department on the CIA's er - ica e o erit in 1962 and Medal of Meri n 1964, will have the title. "di ?ector of investigations for th ational Advisory Commissio n Civil Disorders." It was re orted that his job will,be to su ervise the commission's inves igation - under way since lat my - and coordinate the prob 'th information being gathere h e Justice Department an lawyer, who was with the Y t from 1951 to 1964, first as .an in. late and local p o I i c :tellig'ence officer. and later as assistant general counsel. i Commission Chairman Otto i{erner announced the selection of Miskovsky at a White House press conference and said the former CIA agent would oversee "independent inquiries" to ?de- termine whether a conspiracy was involved in riots that tore through a - score 'of' cities this summer., Officially, Miskovsky, who In announcing the appoint ent, Kerner, -the, governor o llinois, said it "seems logical' hat there was a conspiracy be ind the riots. But he said th ommission has yet W find an\ erner did not mention it, hut t stimony last month before th CPYRGHT conspiracy to foment riots. I Kernor said the 11-member, kestimony from 75 witnesses, in-i L,1..4,;.. ?t,,. ,,,Dune nr Nnurnrk' and Detroit -- cities hardest hit, by this year's riots - would de-, liver Its interim report to Presi ent Johnson "as soon as possi? le" with recommendations for, immediate help" to thwart fur her civil disorders. ' { Rather than recommend newl egislation, the commission in? is interim report probably will` all - for "short-range' assist- nee to low-income areas from: uch sources as private industry nd universities which are locat?; d within the cities, Kerner; .i saying that most of the recent iolence . began with . rock-1 ears olds Kerner said that uni;i ouraging students -to tutor po- Not until the psychic pattern f inferiority among ghetto egroes is eradicated, will the ties be tree or the threat of ore civil, disorders, Kerner accompanied at the White House news conference .by Mayor John Lindsay of New York City, who is vice-chairman of the commis- nor Lindsay, a Republican, r ferred to' urban legislation no Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200340008-1”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp75-00001r000200340008-1: EX-CIA AGENT TO PROBE RIOTS
Synopsis
“Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000200100018-4 JOURNAL OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL Tuesday - 23 October 1973 25X1 25X1 25X1A 25X1 1. Checked with Jack Ticer, Senate Armed Services Committee stall, about the matter of a briefing of Frank Sullivan, of the Committee staff, on Soviet general forces and Soviet and Chinese nuclear programs. ,I reminded Ticer that we were awaiting word from him that Sullivan's top secret security clearance had been reinstituted through the Department of Defense before proceeding to grant him compartmented clear- ances and provide him with the briefing. Ticer recalled our prior conversation on this subject and assured me he would let me know when they have final word from DOD. 2. orothy Fosdick, Senator Jackson's Permanent Subcommi _b _ __ J_aff, called to say that Senator Jackson wanted Richard Perle and her to get a briefing on the "cease fire line" in the Middle East. I told her it was my impression there was no cease fire line as such but I would check and be back in touch with her. Later in the day, after conversations wit and Mr. Maury on the subject, I told Fosdick and Perle that indeed there were no clearly defined "cease fire lines" or clear lines establishing relative positions of the Arabs and Israelis. Perle asked what kind of a map Kissinger, State, had before his discussion in Moscow and I told him I had no idea. I went on to say that with respect to Kissinger's maps, he might want to check with the State Department or, as Maury had suggested to Senator Jackson the other day, they might want to contact the Department of Defense to see if they had any more specific information on the relative position of the Arab/Israeli forces. Perle's only comment was that he would go back to Senator Jackson and perhaps check with the "military people. " 3. 1 1 In response to a call from Scott Cohen, Executive Asrisrar rto iaioz harles Percy (R., Ill. ), Mr. Maury and I talked with him about the situation in the Middle East and Maury briefed him on the scale of military activities of both the Egyptian and Syrian forces using the latest situation reports and the prepared statement which the Director used before the House Armed Services Committee this morning. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-1 5-3 80R00020010001 RC, 7/3/2003”